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Abstract. In the 1980s and at beginning of the 1990s the debate on expectation forma-
tion mechanism was dominated by the rational expectation hypothesis. Later on, more in-
terest was directed towards alternative approaches to expectations analysis, mainly based 
on the bounded rationality paradigm introduced earlier by Herbert A. Simon. The bounded 
rationality approach is used here to describe the way expectations might be formed by dif-
ferent agents. Furthermore, three main hypotheses, namely adaptive, rational and bounded 
ones are being compared and used to indicate why time lags in economic policy prevail 
and are variable.
Keywords: bounded rationality, substantive and procedural rationality, expectation for-
mation, adaptive and rational expectations, time lags.
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1. The theoretical and methodological context
The main focus in mainstream economic theories is not as much on the behavior of 
individual agents as on the outcomes of behaviors and the performance of markets 
and global institutions. Such theories are based on the classical model of rational 
choice built on the assumption that agents are aware of all available alternatives 
and have the ability to assess the outcomes of each possible course of action to be 
taken, Simon (1982a). 
Under the standard economic approach, decisions made by agents are always 
objectively rational. Thus rational agents select scenarios that will serve them best 
to achieve a specifi c utility goal. Under this common approach, rationality is an 
instrumental concept that associates ends and means on the implicit assumption 
that actions aimed at achieving goals are consistent and effective. Notably, agents 
in economics are very seldom differentiated. Rather, they are seen as pursuing the 
uniform goal of maximizing utility or profi t. 
6In cognitive psychology, rational business entities (equipped with specifi c expe-
rience, information and methods of processing information) are expected to reach 
decisions that are orderly and consistent in terms of the applied procedures, Simon 
(1986, p. 210). Thus, contrary to the theory of economics, cognitive psychology 
takes an interest in both rational and irrational behaviors.
Under the standard economic approach, neither individual agents and underta-
kings nor such hierarchical structures as governments (subjects) that formulate eco-
nomic policies satisfy the criteria of the rationality of agents. According to Herbert 
A. Simon, economic theories are deprived of realistic depth and psychological in-
sights. The defi ciencies have become even more pronounced with the evolution 
of quantitative studies and the associated practice of relying on largely simplifi ed 
behavioral assumptions, Czerwinski (1996, p. 66 -67). 
Experimental economics and economic psychology studies suggest that uni-
form treatment of business entities (in terms of their management and decision-
making in the social sphere) leads to oversimplifi cations and even distorted conc-
lusions1. One of the pioneers of integrating economic and psychological research 
is Herbert A. Simon2. An integrated microeconomic theory of behavior forms an 
excellent methodological platform for studying interrelations between the politi-
cal institutions of society and its economic policies, including the mechanism of 
time lag formation3. 
What integrates economic and psychological studies is the recognition that in the 
process of decision-making, individuals rely on limited and somewhat inaccurate 
information that does not readily lend itself to processing. This approach rejects the 
assumption that individuals make perfect decisions to maximize the utility func-
tion. The assumption is an economic precept of mainstream economics and, chie-
fl y, of new classical macroeconomics. A particular implication of this limitation is 
that information on the future may be unavailable, actions are undertaken under a 
certain degree of uncertainty and agents are unaware of the plans of their compe-
titors. Recognition of the effects of limited access to information and the objective 
and subjective problems with processing such information has led to the formula-
tion of the satisfi cing approach and the bounded rationality hypothesis, Kozielecki 
(1977), Simon (1978a). 
1  The purpose of economic psychology is to explain human behavior while accounting for such 
personality factors as motivation, learning, perception and preferences.
2  In 1978, Herbert A. Simon was awarded the Noble Prize for pioneering research on decision-
making processes. 
3  The microeconomic approach focused on psychological factors was developed also by Harvey 
Leibenstein, see e.g. H. Leibenstein, Teoria selektywnej racjonalności…, op. cit. and H. Leibenstein, 
Poza schematem homo oeconomicus. Nowe podstawy mikroekonomii, PWN, Warszawa 1988, (Beyond 
Economic Man. A New Foundation for Microeconomics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 
London 1976). Note also that the work of H.Leibenstein is rarely cited in literature pertaining to 
expectations and economic policy analyses. 
7The satisfi cing approach describes the decision-making process as a search for 
ways of satisfying a specifi ed cutoff level of aspirations, Mosley (1976). Any fa-
ilure to achieve satisfaction of such aspirations triggers adjustive responses i.e., 
according to this methodological approach, the simultaneous launch of new ac-
tions aimed at reaching solutions and a downward correction of aspirations to the 
previous unachieved level. Gradual adjustments of targets (levels of aspiration) 
and actions continue until the subject is assured that a reasonably attainable target 
level (given specifi c internal and external constraints) has been achieved. Seen in 
this way, the decision-making mechanism also seems to be well-suited to descri-
bing the performance of hierarchical institutions and the mechanism of formula-
ting macroeconomic policies.
Precepts of the above research program correspond to those of the institutional 
school. The main research postulate of the institutional school is to replace the pre-
vailing approach based on the notion of homo oeconomicus with a model of be-
haviors that recognizes changes in preferences under the infl uence of institutions, 
the environment and changing motivations. Such factors are interrelated and sub-
ject to adjustments over time.
The key distinguishing features of the institutional school are its focus on regu-
latory mechanisms and state interference and the recognition, in its research work, 
of the signifi cance of a number of other factors. The focus on institutions of all ty-
pes, including governments and their actions, also leads to recognizing the state’s 
impact on the economy. The impact is manifested by the regulatory role of the state 
on the one hand and by its allocative and redistributive functions on the other4. 
An important feature of the institutional approach, particularly evident in the 
works of W. Mitchell and J.R. Commons, is the recognition that the standard as-
sumption of global rationality leads to overestimating the effects of rationality on 
economies, Rutherford (1994, p. 58). According to Mitchell and Commons, ratio-
nality should not be viewed as a process of repeated calculation and deliberation. 
Rationality in economics and, in fact, in human nature, has resulted from the emer-
gence and rise of fi nancial institutions. Once value has been translated into money, 
actions and, thanks to the uniformity of this unit of measure, the process of assessing 
the available options to be acted upon, had to become rational. Note that under this 
approach, rationality is an acquired feature that gradually changes on a spectrum. 
Seen in this way, the ability to differentiate grades of rationality depends on the 
extent to which areas of human activity are governed by monetary relations.
Having adopted this view, one may postulate that, in certain fi elds (including 
elections), decisions of agents may be permanently inconsistent with the rationa-
lity standard applied in mainstream economics. In fact, decisions are affected by 
4  It is worth noting that in mainstream economics, the state (the government) is either seen as 
neutral for economic phenomena and mechanisms or as a source of disruptions of market mechanisms 
and X ineffi ciency.
8such diffi cult-to-quantify factors as conventions, routines, norms and customs5. It 
should also be noted that in addition to the degree of economic coercion (risk le-
vel), the factors that keep agents from reaching deliberate decisions each time also 
include:
–  long time lags between decisions and their effects (e.g. potential changes in the 
economy),
–  long intervals between election rounds – low frequency of election events,
–  limited direct impact of individual decisions on the global outcome,
–  diffi culties with quantifying the potential effects of selecting specifi c options 
available to individuals.
A study of the legacy of the institutional school (the new institutional school) to 
date provides additional proof in support of the postulate that rather than delibera-
tely analyzing individual choices, subjects tend to be governed by rules and sche-
mes6. In today’s institutional economics, rules or rather decision-making schemes 
are adopted as a result of, Rutherford (1994, p. 68):
–  the cost of information and decision–making,
–  constraints on cognition and information processing,
–  the risk of errors occurring in attempts to adjust actions in response to particular 
changes,
–  the perceived benefi ts to be derived by subjects from applying a rule.
The above observations suggest that research programs carried out in accordan-
ce with the institutional approach and the choice of the main factors taken into ac-
count in this approach are designed to describe mechanisms rather than fi nd ways 
of predicting them. This is because accounting for a large number of factors (parti-
cularly the qualitative ones) hinders the qualitative analyses of their impact on the 
economy. Note, however, that accurate quantifi cations are not what this approach 
(that sees reality as incoherent and largely disorderly) aims to accomplish7. It sho-
uld also be noted that a particularly important link between the institutional appro-
ach and H. Simon’s hypothesis is the recognition that the rationality of subjects is 
bounded in nature, Jensen (1987). 
This analysis shows that the research program of the institutional school is aimed 
at analyzing decision-making mechanisms and rules adopted by individual agents 
and hierarchical institutions. The school emphasizes the complexity of decision-
5  See e.g. W. Brian Arthur, Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality (the El Farol Problem), 
American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 84, 406, 1994 and Paul A. David, Path 
dependence, its critics and quest for historical economics, in: Evolution and Path Dependence in 
Economic Ideas: Past and Present, edited by P. Garrouste and p. Ioannides, Edward Elgar 200.
6  The emergence of the new institutional school in the 1980s and 1990s should be associated 
mainly with the work of Olivier Williamson and Ronald Coase. The signifi cance of this school of 
economic thought was recognized by awarding the Nobel Prize in Economics to R. Coase (1991). 
7  The views are shared by representatives of other schools in economics. An example is G.L.S. 
Shackle associated with the Neo-Austrian school. 
9making and provides reasons for which differentiation should be seen as the main 
feature of agents. Under such an approach, agents, in their specifi c economic and 
social roles, differ not only in terms of the capital they hold and the degree to which 
they are governed by the market but also in terms of their perceptive capacities and 
preferences and, consequently, the ways in which they form expectations. The ap-
proach provides a method for studying responses to political changes on the part 
of individual types of agents and on the part of the economy as a whole and may 
well be one of the most important tools for explaining the absence of unambigu-
ous empirical verifi cations of quantitative models, including the models of politi-
cal business cycles8.
2. The nature of rationality according to Herbert A. Simon 
Herbert A. Simon has worked with John Muth, Charles Holt and Franco Modigliani 
in a team formed to develop a general theory of the business ventures and methods 
of describing and analyzing inventory management. The outcome of their work was 
a book and, most of all, hypotheses that had a tremendous impact on the develop-
ment of the theory of economics in the years that followed, Holt at al (1960). 
The most important assumptions adopted by this team of four authors, other 
than the square criterion function, included the recognition that the distribution of 
the future events probabilities may be expressed in terms of their expected values. 
This approach was subsequently used and developed by J.F. Muth who put forth 
the hypothesis that business entities act rationally in circumstances of economic 
uncertainty and, most importantly, postulated the hypothesis of rational expecta-
tions. While describing the nature of differences between both authors’ views of 
rationality, H.A. Simon observed that what the team saw as a working simplifi ca-
tion of the complexity of the real world became a very important argument for glo-
bal (unbounded) rationality for the original postulator of the hypotheses of rational 
expectations (and for his successors), Simon (1982a, p. 486). H.A. Simon noted 
that instead of focusing on uncertainty and developing a decision-making model, 
J.F. Muth assessed the process as insignifi cant for and negligible in formulating a 
model of expectations. 
H.A. Simon also noted that the only reason why the four authors chose the parti-
cular form of the criterion function for dynamic programming was to simplify cal-
culations. The adopted form of the function was not supported by any studies that 
would provide theoretical grounds for the adoption of the square function of cho-
ice. The square function of choice was additionally used in the studies of economic 
8  The factor is often referred to in literature as Goodhart’s law.
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policy decisions. The fi rst applications in this fi eld are related to the works by Ch. 
Holt and H. Theil, Holt (1962), and Theil (1964). This trend in research based on 
the implicit substantive rationality hypothesis was also used in applying the optimal 
control theory to studying economic stabilization policies, Pindyck (1983). 
As mentioned earlier, in mainstream economics, unbounded (objective) ratio-
nality is an attribute of the effects of actions and, by the same token, of the resul-
ting choices. The process of reaching such choices itself falls beyond the scope of 
interest of mainstream economics. The practical implication of this fact is that, in 
the concept of rationality, the conditions and limitations are factors of the external 
environment in which agents operate. There is also another particularly signifi cant 
feature. The application of unbounded rationality to describe economic processes 
requires additional decisions to fi ne-tune the adopted precepts, Simon (1985). Thus, 
the assumption made in analyzing the performance of a business undertaking is that 
the function of utility should be recognized as a function of profi t. Similarly, in the 
case of analyzing the infl uence of a government on an economy, the criterion func-
tion of a governmental economic policy is the maximization of economic welfare. 
Another effect of the use of the unbounded rationality hypothesis in economics is 
that the theories of cycles and disequilibria call for additional precepts which, in 
effect, impose bounds on the rationality of agents, Simon (1985). The result is that 
most conclusions drawn with the use of economic models are not made on the as-
sumption that subjects act rationally but rather by applying the bounding auxiliary 
assumptions. It is diffi cult to disagree with H.A. Simon’s postulate that such auxi-
liary assumptions describing specifi c bounds of rationality differentiate individu-
al schools of economic thought. What is more, the bounds are rarely adopted as a 
result of empirical studies. Rather, they constitute more or less original constructs 
developed by authors of theories and hypotheses. 
H.A. Simon was the fi rst to postulate (in his work published in 1955) that the 
concept of global rationality that prevailed in mainstream economics be replaced 
with another paradigm, Simon (1955). Simon’s approach followed from the need 
to depart from the belief in the universal rationality of homo oeconomicus and to 
recognize that an agent’s rationality must be established in the context of both the 
availability of information and the agent’s ability to process and take advantage of 
the available set of information. According to H.A. Simon, general rationality is 
a behavior pattern adopted to achieve a given goal in the circumstances of limita-
tions and restrictions imposed by the environment, Simon (1978b, p. 405). Such a 
general defi nition of rationality provided by H.A. Simon is a fi rst step towards di-
stinguishing between its two forms: the substantive and the procedural rationality9. 
The parallel concepts of substantive and procedural rationality have been proposed 
by Tadeusz Kotarbiński independently of H.A. Simon. The concepts were then fur-
9  In his publications, H.A. Simon uses the terms procedural and bounded rationality interchange-
ably.
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ther developed and applied by, among others, Oskar Lange10. 
H.A. Simon observed that agents may pursue maximization (of a preference func-
tion) as well as they might seek to rank the available options. Simon also noted that, 
in the most general sense, limitations might take the forms of, Simon (1978b):
–  objective descriptions of the environment,
–  subjective characteristics of the environment (as perceived by the agent),
–  descriptions of the agent itself.
In light of prior observations, it should be noted that H.A. Simon’s theory stres-
ses a microeconomic view and the diversity of decision-making agents. Seen in 
this way, the theory is in strong opposition to reductionism.
The approach developed by H.A. Simon in subsequent years and known as the 
bounded rationality hypothesis has not been applied directly in economic policy 
research despite the fact that the focus on decision-making and the resulting option 
of diversifi ed agents provided a wealth of methodological and cognitive possibi-
lities. Gradually, however, in the 1990s views changed, giving rise to an interest 
in the notion of rationality based on the psychological precepts of cognition to be 
used in the economic policy studies Conlisk (1996). 
It should be noted that theoretical approach, as used by H. Simon, implies the 
existence of various rational choice models that vary depending on presumptions 
as to which variables are to be treated as given and as bounds within which agents 
make their rational choices. Such standard bounds, which themselves may consti-
tute subjects of rational deliberations, include, Simon (1955, p. 100): 
–  sets of open–ended alternatives,
–  relations describing effects (degrees of effectiveness) as a function of open-en-
ded alternatives,
–  the rating and order of effects of actions.
Having identifi ed the limitations and variables that remain beyond an agent’s con-
trol, it is possible to identify the variables that an agent controls and therefore opti-
mizes. Seen in this way, optimization is a rational adaptive response of an agent. 
2.1. Substantive rationality 
H.A. Simon defi nes rational behavior described in the sense of substantive rationa-
lity as behavior aimed at achieving a specifi c goal within the limitations and bar-
riers imposed by an agent’s external environment, Simon (1976, p. 130), and Simon 
(1985, p. 294). An important characteristic of such an approach to rationality is the 
emphasis on end outcomes and the fact that features of the decision-making agent 
itself and the psychological theory of behaviors are ignored. As mentioned earlier, 
10 See T. Kotarbiński, Traktat o dobrej robocie, Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe. Zakład im. 
Ossolińskich of Wrocław, Łódź 1955 and O. Lange, Ekonomia polityczna, PWE, Warszawa 1975.
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substantive rationality, an approach concerned with types of decisions reached by 
agents, is a fundamental notion in the mainstream economics.
Substantive rationality is a key element of the hypotheses of rational expectations 
and the new classical macroeconomics. Defi ned in this way, rationality is an intel-
lectual strength and an attribute of the effects of actions rather than of the decision-
making process. Substantive rationality, as applied in economics, is refl ected in the 
assumptions as to the function of utility used by business entities, Simon (1985, p. 
296). The utility function may take any form as long as it helps consistently sort 
out all choices available to an agent. The other supplementary assumption is that 
an agent always selects the option that provides the best utility11. The dominance 
of substantive rationality in economic sciences has an impact on methodologies 
which, as a consequence, are dominated by reductionism. In particular, from the 
point of view of economic psychology, the main weaknesses of economic metho-
dology are that, Simon (1978b): 
–  economics has failed to develop a methodology for analyzing ways in which 
agents account for individual aspects of reality in their decision-making,
–  the ways in which agents defi ne the situations of choice are not suffi ciently 
known.
Agents operating in circumstances of uncertainty make use of the subjective 
expected utility. It is not possible to verify directly the hypotheses formulated in 
this way in real life, Kowalski (2001). It has also been found in experimental set-
tings that agents not only fail to determine in a consistent manner the probability 
of occurrence of events but also have no consistent utility functions, Simon (1985, 
p. 296), and Kahneman and Tversky (1973), (2000)12. Failures in empirical tests 
of models that ignore agents’ characteristics and the learning and decision-making 
processes have led to the rise of procedural rationality studies. 
2.2. Procedural rationality 
The concept of procedural rationality has been originally developed in psychology 
and subsequently applied in economic research by H.A. Simon. The concept may be 
applied to individual and collective (hierarchically structured) entities. According 
to Simon, behavior can be generally described as procedurally rational if supported 
with proper deliberation, Simon (1976, p. 133). Defi ned in this way, the notion of 
rationality can be scaled and implies an emphasis on choices and decision making. 
11 In effect, although no direct assumptions are made of (the need for) knowledge on the detailed 
objectives of an entity, one should presume that the main purpose is to maximize utility. H. Leibenstein 
questions the need for using the concept of utility in reference to entities other than human persons. 
See Poza schematem by the same author, op. cit., p. 23-24.
12 See also A. Tversky, and P. Slovic, The causes of preference reversal, American Economic 
Review, 1990 (March), vol. 80.
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The concept of procedural rationality is built on the assumption of limited knowled-
ge and limited abilities to acquire and process information13. Such assumptions im-
ply that agents are incapable of making objectively optimal choices, Simon (1985, 
p. 294). Thus, procedurally rational behavior involves learning to adapt actions to 
constraints imposed by the environment and to an agent’s internal limitations and 
qualities. The hypothesis allows for more realistic descriptions and analyses of the 
expectation formation and decision-making processes. 
The structure of the bounded rationality hypothesis is not easily expressed in 
a formal manner. The hypothesis’ postulate of incomplete information and, even 
more importantly, of agents’ limited ability to obtain and process information, can 
be operationalized by accounting for the cost of deliberation in a model rested on 
the assumption of bounded rationality. Generally speaking, the cost of delibera-
tion is the time and inputs required to form expectations and ultimately use them 
in decision making.
The recognition of the bounded rationality hypothesis and its application also 
to such hierarchical entities as governments (bodies formulating and implemen-
ting economic policies) helps also to understand the source of time lags, Kowalski 
(2001, chap. 4). This is particularly important in non-standard circumstances in 
which individual choices are either unknown or insuffi ciently known and uncerta-
in and cause the prolongation of the internal time lag. It should also be noted that, 
in real-life conditions, decision makers operating in hierarchical structures com-
monly rely on incongruent utility functions. Such complex decision-making pro-
blems are better described with the use of an approach based on the bounded ra-
tionality hypothesis. 
Today’s processes shaping procedural rationality are signifi cantly affected by qu-
antitative and qualitative advances in information technology manifested by incre-
ases in both the computing power, the availability of information and the effi cien-
cy of data transfers14. While such advances promote globalization by dramatically 
increasing the amount of available information, they also tend to increase greatly 
the complexity of economic phenomena and processes. This can be seen in rapid 
changes occurring in behavioral relations in economies and in increases in the level 
of uncertainty. Thus, agents become more widely diversifi ed in terms of their ability 
to use and interpret information. One might postulate, therefore, that the processes 
support R. Lucas’ arguments with respect to barriers to and diffi culties in modeling 
and interpreting macroeconomic phenomena, Kowalski (2001, chap. 2). 
13 It is due to the recognition of limited access to information and limited knowledge of entities 
that the terms procedural and bounded rationality are used interchangeably. 
14 The computing power of computers doubles every 18 months (Moor’s Law); the global net-
work of data transmission centers has increased its capacities 1 million times in the last 20 years. 
Also, the cost of computer information processing has been falling at the rate of 30% a year. Cf. The 
Economist, Sept. 28th, 1996. 
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The scope of H.A. Simon’s approach allows for the recognition of a number of 
factors treated as constant in the concept of substantive rationality (as described 
earlier). Such variable factors include motives, the degree of economic coercion, the 
level of risk and the effects of emotions. In addition to the main characteristics of 
procedural rationality, such factors will result in pronounced differences in expec-
tation formation and the decisions made in their consequence.
According to H.A. Simon, in order to describe procedurally rational actions, 
account needs to be taken of the goals of agents acquiring information from the 
environment, Simon (1985, p. 294). The approach relies on examining the extent 
to which agents develop the concepts of their goals, gain information and acquire 
their ability to draw conclusions. Such programs of research draw directly on co-
gnitive psychology. They involve the study of the heuristics used by individuals 
equipped with limited cognitive abilities. According to cognitive psychology, heu-
ristics is rational in the sense of relying on intuition to avoid costly deliberation, 
yet, it also involves bounded rationality (as defi ned by H.A. Simon) as they often 
lead to repeated errors, Conlisk (1996, p. 678). Evidence of similarities between 
H.A. Simon’s approach and those of cognitive psychology lies in the fact that, in 
the problem solving models proposed by the latter, individuals are described as, 
Simon (1985, p. 295):
–  having a limited ability to process information,
–  conducting selected and erratic (due to ignorance) searches for information and 
solutions which typically lead only to the identifi cation of a satisfying solu-
tion,
–  seeking to defi ne the effects of their actions. 
The adoption of the bounded rationality hypothesis need not necessarily spell a 
complete rejection of the substantive rationality paradigm and the resulting optimal 
behavior postulate. One might claim that in standard recurring situations, agents 
relying on their experience, etc. may be relatively fast and accurate in predicting 
the approximate outcome of applying an optimization procedure. The accuracy of 
predicting such outcomes will be best when market pressures are strong, products 
are uniform, data is easily accessible and decisions are made professionally. The 
above best describes the fi nancial sector, especially in a free market.
A summary of the precepts and features of substantive and procedural rationa-
lities is provided in Table 1. Table 1 shows that procedural rationality helps reco-
gnize signifi cant distinguishing attributes of agents and, in effect, may constitute a 
basis for classifying different agents in terms of their actual ability to adopt beha-
viors expected within the framework of substantive rationality.
The notion of procedural rationality is particularly well suited to dealing with 
highly complex real-life situations faced by increasingly complex business enti-
ties, Simon (1982b). As a consequence of such complexity, conceptualizations of 
the environment and competing agents are far from accurate. The approach resting 
15
on assumptions developed on the basis of procedural rationality is especially ap-
propriate with respect to choices made in parliamentary elections. Such choices 
refl ect complex sets of factors that are diffi cult to measure. The most important 
factors include the state of the economy, election programs, habits, the degree of 
loyalty and conventions. As a result of long intervals between elections, long time 
lags between elections and their outcomes and limited effects of individual elec-
tion decisions on the end result, agents (voters) operate under limited market coer-
cion and reach decisions that could hardly be described as rational in terms of the 
rational expectations hypothesis. 
A key characteristic of the notion of procedural rationality is that it can only be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis, Simon (1976, p. 133). In other words, every case 
is different and requires a specifi c process of cognition and a specifi c level of in-
formation processing effectiveness. One possible way to overcome such diversity 
is to apply normative concepts of the statistical decision theory in circumstances 
of risk and uncertainty. The approach works well (in experimental conditions) only 
if experiments are kept very simple, Simon (1976)15. 
3.  Expectation formation in the conditions of the bounded 
rationality hypothesis
The adoption of the bounded rationality hypothesis, as proposed by H.A. Simon, 
can have a strong impact on the way of analyzing and modeling the expectation 
formation process. In light of the above observations, it may be postulated that the 
Table 1. Comparison of precepts and features of substantive and procedural 
rationality
Form of 
rationality
Knowledge 
of agent’s 
objectives
Objective 
description of 
a situation
Knowledge 
of agent’s 
characteristics
Subjective 
concept of 
information 
on the 
environment
Ability 
to draw 
conclusions 
based on 
information 
Substantive + + (-) - (-)
Procedural + - + + +
+ Recognized feature / precept, (-) Feature / precept not recognized explicitly,- not recognized.
S o u r c e : Author’s work.
15 Ibid. This normative approach was used, among others, by Alberto Alesina in studying the ef-
fects of political developments, and particularly elections, on economic policies. See also Kowalski 
(2001, ch. 5 and 6).
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process of expectation formation is diversifi ed and affected not only by external 
factors but also by the internal attributes of an agent. It is therefore necessary to 
differentiate agents in terms of the forms of rationality they have adopted and to 
recognize the parallel existence of different but equally viable expectation models. 
Most generally, the sources of such differentiation can be presented, as in Figure 1, 
on the basis of notions described earlier. Economies associated with the same pe-
riods or fragments of reality may be described with the use of diverse contempo-
raneously existing models of expectation formation and states of expectation. The 
postulate of the existence of parallel and equally viable expectation models is vital 
for evaluating and methodologically verifying detailed models of economies, inc-
luding models of correlations between election mechanisms and macroeconomic 
decisions on the one hand and the performance of the economy on the other.
Fig. 1. Context of and factors affecting expectation formation according to the 
bounded (procedural) rationality hypothesis
S o u r c e : Author’s work
Decision/Actions
Information
Perception
Determination
Deliberation
(assessments/preferences)
Expectations
In
te
rn
al
co
n
te
x
t Ex
tern
al
co
n
tex
t
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A key to describing the impact of agents’ decisions is to recognize that they are 
not simply an outcome (function) of expectations. Decisions are also functions of 
factors inherent in the agents, particularly their views on and approach to risk ta-
king, the level of determination and coercion on the part of the market. The lack of 
simple correlations between a formed expectation and the decisions based thereon 
makes the model of an economy even more complex. The recognition of the im-
portance of limitations for the ability to obtain and process information may sug-
gest that expectation formation should be treated as a particularly complex learning 
process in which an important role is played by the cost of deliberation.
To conceptualize the process, one might adopt a method proposed by J. Conlisk 
(1996, p. 685). The method relies on the need, emphasized and postulated herein, to 
recognize the model of broadly defi ned deliberation costs. In particular, such costs 
include the inputs needed to obtain information, the cost of processing information, 
and – in hierarchical organizations – personnel costs as a function of information 
needs and – additionally in households – the alternative cost of leisure and/or lost 
income. Furthermore, the subjective aspect of deliberation may include mood, fa-
tigue and any perceived consequences of departing from a convention. Such a bro-
ad view of deliberation and its costs suggests the existence of different classes of 
agents for different degrees of market coercion bearing upon such agents, different 
abilities of the agents to search for and process information and different levels of 
incentives they receive to do so. It should also be noted that, for the most part, de-
liberation attributes may not take on a money form. Further, the circumstances fa-
ced by individual subjects and, in particular, voters assessing the competencies of 
a government in rounds of election widely distributed over time, are not conducive 
to forming expectations and making decisions in line with unbounded rationality 
as postulated in mainstream economics. 
The addition of deliberation costs to those of expectation formation further incre-
ases the cost of solving a particular problem. A next logical question is how should 
deliberation be dispensed in various situations requiring expectation formation and 
how does deliberation change depending on agent type. The general task faced by 
an expectation forming agent can be described in the following manner.
Let us assume that a subject is forming its expectations as to the variable X e and 
that Π(X) is the set of possible states of variable X. The assumption is that Π(X) 
has only one optimal value X e* that corresponds to the accuracy of expectation for-
mation postulated in the hypothesis of rational expectations. If, given the availa-
ble information, the agent forms such expectations for a variable X e equal to X e*, 
its expectations, from the point of view of the end result (substantive rationality), 
will meet the conditions imposed by the rational expectations hypothesis. The de-
liberation cost can be included directly in the problem defi ned in such a way in the 
following manner, Conlisk (1996). One may modify input parameters by recogni-
zing that fi nding an X e equal to X e* will be extremely costly. This is because of fac-
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tors in the environment (the actual high complexity of the phenomenon for which 
expectations are being formed) or the absence of suffi ciently strong and clear in-
centives to form an expectation in an organized and careful manner. In the latter 
case, expectations are formed by entities with respect to circumstances in which 
the degree of the agent’s determination is relatively low and in which the effects 
of any decisions based on such expectations do not clearly translate into material 
benefi ts or losses16. 
Having recognized that the formation of optimal i.e. accurate expectations (as 
defi ned in the rational expectations hypothesis) is extremely costly, one can distin-
guish various deliberation technologies and, in effect, establish a spectrum of ratio-
nality for the formed expectations. Let T denote the cost of deliberations incurred 
in searching for X e* and let17: 
X
e
0
 denote expectations formed on the basis of experience and custom (without 
resorting to deliberation (T = 0),
X
T
e denote expectations formed on the basis of deliberation, T  ≥ 0,
C   denote the cost (extent) of deliberation per agent,
u    denote random disturbances of the expectation formation process.
Given the above denotations, the deliberation process that accompanies expec-
tation formation can be expressed in the form of function (1): 
                                              X G T X X u
T
e e e= ( ), , ,* 0 .                                          (1)
Assuming that the properties of function G T X X ue e, , ,
*
0( ) are such that X e(T ) 
changes stochastically from X e
0
 to X e* as T increases from 0 to ∞, two extreme ca-
ses may be distinguished, Conlisk (1996). If, in the process of forming expecta-
tions, an agent does not engage in deliberations (i.e. if C assumes a high value and 
T = 0), then the process of expectations formation proceeds on the basis of expe-
rience (custom) and can be expressed as X e = X e
0
18. Hence, either the status quo is 
accepted or expectations are formed by a simple rule. A formal expression of such 
a rule is the model of adaptive expectations. If an agent functions in circumstan-
ces that stimulate high determination, its willingness to invest in deliberation will 
grow (T > 0). If, however, in an extreme case scenario, the cost of deliberation per 
agent is zero (C = 0), then the total investment will approach infi nity (T = ∞). In such 
a case, according to the above assumptions, X e will equal X e* and, with respect to 
the end result, function (1) will describe circumstances postulated in the rational 
expectations hypothesis. 
16 The class includes election choices. A key factor here is that such choices are made on the as-
sumption that individual decisions have little signifi cance on the fi nal outcome of an election (and 
on the resulting level of prosperity).
17 For simplicity, subscripts designating time have been omitted.
18 The lack of deliberation may result from extremely high costs or little incentive to increase in-
puts on deliberation.
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The case that best refl ects reality is the intermediate case in which the cost of 
deliberation is greater than zero but smaller than infi nity (0 < T < ∞). In such a case, 
agents set their deliberation efforts depending on external and internal factors. Thus, 
at the minimum level of rationality in expectations formation, agents secure net be-
nefi ts on the formed expectations after deliberation costs. The assumption that deli-
beration may be an expression of procedural rationality allows us better to support 
the above-mentioned postulate of the gradual nature of rationality and, by the same 
token, of the gradual nature and variability of the expectation models adopted by 
various agents. The following classifi cation of agents is proposed in terms of com-
petitive pressures and the related ability and willingness to obtain and process in-
formation:
1. Agents operating in unrestricted and unifi ed markets (in particular central banks, 
fi nancial sector companies and undertakings operating on mass markets),
2. Businesses operating on national and local markets,
3. Central governments and their agencies,
4. Individuals acting as:
a) hired labor,
b) consumers,
c) voters.
In the case of expectations formed by professional agents (groups 1, 2 and 3), 
the frames of reference are different and the theoretical bases more consistent than 
in the case of expectations formed by households and individual agents. The pro-
fessionalization of expectations on the part of agents classifi ed in group 1 is ma-
nifested by, among other things, the division of work, specialization, reliance on a 
single standard of knowledge, uniform evaluation criteria and access to integrated 
sources of information. A common theoretical and methodological background is 
particularly characteristic of the fi nancial sector.
In light of the above observations, the above classifi cation (with items arranged 
in descending order in terms of their willingness and ability to obtain and process 
information) can be used to assign the most likely and suitable expectation forma-
tion models to the distinguished agents (table 2). As implied in table 2, subjects 
use a variety of expectation models. The choice of such models (the likelihood of 
model selection) is a function of the above-mentioned factors, which include pro-
cedural rationality and market pressures applied to the agent in question19. Subjects 
distinguished for the purposes of the analysis build their expectations primarily on 
the basis of experience and rules. Such experience and rules of thumb are supple-
mented with higher degree models according to external factors. In this context, 
19 The recognition of differences between expectation formation models in cases where their end 
results converge is in line with the notion of paramorphism. For information on paramorphism, see 
P.J. Hoffman, The paramorphic representation of clinical judgment, Psychological Bulletin, 1960, 
vol. 67: after J. Kozielecki, Psychologiczna teoria, …, op. cit.
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one may postulate that the predictability of economic behaviors of agents is largely 
dependent on the common features of the expectation formation process, including 
the role of experience and rules, comp. Heiner (1983).
An important effect of differentiated expectation formation processes is time 
lags in agents’ reactions to new information and phenomena. Time lags are of cri-
tical importance for both normative analyses and, especially studies of the effects 
of economic policies on the economy. As a result of expectations, time lags chan-
ge both in terms of their length and their interim characteristics. In the light of the 
models and hypotheses discussed in this paper, it should be noted that in the case 
of circumstances described in the rational expectations hypothesis, the length of 
time lags will approach zero. In the case of the bounded rationality hypothesis, 
time lags will differ from zero. Their lengths will depend on the above-described 
factors and particularly on how recent the received information is and how domi-
nant the specifi c distinguished types of agents are in transmission channels. The 
recognition of the importance of behavioral factors for describing the process of 
expectation formation should prompt more studies on agents’ behavior in circum-
stances of limited access to information. The adoption of a methodological view 
based on the bounded rationality hypothesis implies that subjects use diverse and 
equally viable expectation models (table 3). 
One may assume that in formulating expectations for a variable characterized 
by high frequency data, professional agents will be in a position to defi ne proba-
bilities and adaptive models and models containing weak forms of the rational 
expectation hypothesis will be the most likely expectation models (cf. table 2). In 
the case of events that are totally unprecedented or very rare, agents will make use 
of heuristics based on the bounded rationality hypothesis. A viable option may be 
to employ the satisfi cing approach or a method based on a neural network. In the 
light of the above observations, it is worth noting that the process of expectation 
formation is non-continuous and subject to differentiation both in terms of the na-
ture of phenomena (that are subjects of expectation formation) and in terms of the 
type of the expectation forming agent.
Table 2. Agent type and likelihood of selecting particular expectation formation 
model
Agent type
Model
Hierarchical Individual
1 2 3 4a 4b 4c
Rational expectation model (+)
Adaptive expectation model + + (+) (+)
Bounded rationality model + + + + + (+)
Experience/habit (+) (+) (+) + + +
+ Prevalent use, (+) Likely provisional use.
S o u r c e : Author’s work.
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The adoption of the bounded rationality hypothesis implies two basic and mu-
tually interrelated strategies for the analysis of expectation formation and the per-
formance of economies. One may involve an eclectic approach that would inte-
grate multiple expectation models with the use of, for instance, neural nets. Such 
a view of the expectation formation process may be based on prior education and 
the knowledge acquired in the process of such education. Much of the knowledge 
acquired in the course of pursuing studies by individuals forming expectations is 
not properly integrated. Thus, the rule is that either lectures are given on specifi c 
schools of economic thought or the eclectic approach is dominant starting at the 
stage of education. All this has a tremendous impact on standards and rules that 
shape the behaviors of business agents.
Another expectation formation strategy may be to adopt expectation models spe-
cifi c for a given group of agents. Subsequent adjustments may be made as, having 
gained new information and having come under changed competitive pressures, 
agents switch from models based on simple rules and standards to their more com-
plex equivalents. Under this approach, an important cause of such switches (chan-
ges) of expectation models may be the creativity and industriousness of agents and 
Table 3. Principal expectation formation hypotheses – key assumptions and features
Assumptions and 
features
Adaptive expectations 
hypothesis
Rational expectation 
hypothesis
Expectations acc. to 
bounded rationality 
hypothesis
Assumptions of 
Rationality
Implicit assumption of 
substantive rationality
Explicit assumption of 
substantive rationality
Assumption of 
bounded rationality
Model’s role in 
expectation hypothesis
Simple decision-
making rule
“True” 
model
No uniform model
Information 
processing cost
Unaccounted for Ignored or not 
signifi cant for task
Signifi cant
Signifi cance of 
retrospection
Key factor One of many factors One of many factors
Role of forecasting No reference Key factor One of many factors
Context, type of agent No reference Uniform treatment of 
agents
Signifi cant 
differentiating factor
Access to information No reference Optimized Limited
Relation of 
expectations to 
decisions
No reference Identity (implicit) Possible gap between 
expectations and 
decisions
Time lag implications Integral part 
of economy 
descriptions
Approaching zero Integral part 
of economy 
descriptions
Psychological 
profi le
No reference No reference 
(homo oeconomicus)
Signifi cant part of 
hypothesis 
S o u r c e : Author’s work.
22
fl uctuations resulting from change cycles affecting the phenomena for which expec-
tations are formed, including the agents’ general business activities. Expectation 
models adopted by agents in given periods and the expectations themselves may 
be subject to sudden switches and adjustments triggered by the acquisition of unfo-
reseen information that considerably contradicts previous trends.
4. Conclusions
The research approach subscribed to by H.A. Simon relies on microeconomic ana-
lyses. With its emphasis on psychological factors, the approach focuses on exa-
mining outcomes and, in particular, on processes behind outcomes. It attempts to 
describe the insides of the “black box” of the homo oeconomicus hypothesis in 
mainstream economics. 
Economic psychology studies show that agents are frequently motivated to survi-
ve and/or avoid failure rather than to maximize the expected utility. The actual con-
ditions under which agents operate are far more complex than assumed in standard 
economic models and studies. The extent of simplifi cations, especially those made 
with respect to rationality and the process of expectation formation, results not only 
from the need to reduce the inherent complexity of the research subject to a level 
manageable in terms of formal analysis. In some cases where simplifi cations lead to 
ignoring the question of procedural rationality, broadly defi ned calculation costs are 
included in the total costs causing tasks to be subjected to the classical procedure of 
economic choice based solely on the concept of substantive rationality. Such a so-
lution may be suffi cient only as an approximation of very simple standard problems 
but will not allow for an effective analysis of a decision-making problem20. 
The bounded rationality hypothesis as defi ned by H.A. Simon and the unboun-
ded rationality hypothesis (of which the rational expectation hypothesis is a form) 
are two coherent and separate theoretical systems. The rational expectation hypo-
thesis is an extension of the classical economic theory and relies on specialized 
techniques and methods of formalizing theoretical analysis. Studies based on the 
bounded rationality hypothesis are still in their development stages and have no 
specifi c apparatus of their own for formalizing analyses.
A key factor affecting economic processes and decisions is expectations. H.A. 
Simon’s hypothesis implies that, objectively speaking, there is no uniformly pre-
valent expectation formation model. Under the bounded rationality hypothesis, the 
rational expectation model, as defi ned by J.Muth, certainly is not such a represen-
tative model. A recognition of the diversity of agents in one’s research approach 
20 See e.g. H.A. Simon, Rationality as process and as product of thought, and by the same author: 
Rationality, in: Models of Bounded…, op. cit.
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allows one to grasp better the mechanisms of expectation formation and reveal im-
portant sources of time lags in economies’ responses to economic policy stimuli 
and internal as well as external shocks.
The methodological perspective built around the bounded rationality hypothesis 
points to the need for research on microeconomic behavior, including the econo-
mic mechanisms behind the agents’ election decisions. Furthermore, the bounded 
rationality hypothesis indicates that an important factor preventing simple mode-
ling of processes spread widely over time is the incomparability of external con-
ditions. Another signifi cant obstacle is the changeability of external factors that, 
as demonstrated in this paper, has a strong impact on changes in the way reality is 
conceptualized in the expectation formation process. In the case of elections, a par-
ticularly signifi cant factor is the specifi c nature of each election event. Differences 
in the nature of such events can also be seen in the natural demographic processes 
that considerably change the compositions of electorates.
In addition to expectations, an important role in economic behavior is played 
by preferences. Their signifi cance can be seen in the case of election decisions. 
Preferences are not constant. Rather, they are a function of institutional, personal 
and material constraints. However, the actual changeability of preferences is stabi-
lized by selective perceptions and limited abilities to absorb new information.
I would like to thank A. Łukaszewicz, W. Wilczyński and A. Wojtyna and an 
anonymous referee for the comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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